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Jonah Lehrer’s book Imagine: How Creativity Works was discredited when 
it was discovered that it included fabricated quotes by Bob Dylan. It was 
also criticised for cherry picking the science of creativity and adding little 
of worth to the literature on the subject.  
While this may be true, I suggest that much scientific literature about 
creativity is already epistemologically and methodologically incoherent, 
and characterised by the treatment of creativity as something with stable 
ontic status, rather than something which is always, inevitably produced 
through cultural processes of interpretation and association. An 
examination, using the tools of discourse analysis, of some of the research 
papers cited by Lehrer, along with other related examples, reveals some of 
the assumptions and rhetorical manoeuvres at work. 
Despite the overt falsehoods in his book, the stories that Jonah Lehrer tells 
us are consistent with the stories that the research, science, and policy tell 
us about creativity – all are equally fanciful. Nevertheless, if we choose to 
suspend our disbelief in such stories, and their rhetorical prestidigitation, 
there are some comforts and pleasures to be obtained from the illusion of 
essential humanity that they create. 
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The Disgrace of Jonah Lehrer (and why he was already wrong 
about creativity) 
In 2012 the journalist Jonah Lehrer resigned from his post at the New 
Yorker after admitting that he fabricated quotes from Bob Dylan in his 
book Imagine: How Creativity Works. His deception was exposed by the 
journalist Michael Moynihan who, keen to track down the sources for 
seven of the Dylan quotes (Ulaby, 2012), ended up getting Lehrer to 
confess that the quotes ‘either did not exist, were unintentional 
misquotations, or represented improper combinations of previously 
existing quotes’ (Myers, 2012). But prior to this Lehrer’s book, despite 
debuting -at the top of the New York Times non-fiction bestseller list 
(Holpuch, 2012) had already been criticised for its uncritical faith in 
neuroscience to reveal the mysteries of creativity. Steven Poole, for 
example indicts Lehrer for his ‘neuroscientism’: ‘[the] promise that brain-
scans (using the limited current technologies of fMRI and EEG) can explain 
the workings of the mind’ (Poole, 2012). There are two key points in 
Poole’s scathing review which, I think, are useful charges against Lehrer, 
but also the general field of ‘creativity research’. The first pertains 
specifically to neuroscience: ‘The inconvenient truth is that observing 
which areas of the brain light up on a screen during experiment tells us 
little about “how creativity works”’; the second is applicable more widely: 
The larger problem…is the sheer variety of activities that Lehrer has 
conflated without argument as representing "creativity" or 
"imagination". The composition of a song or poem is just assumed to 
be the same sort of thing as the solving of a hoary riddle or word-puzzle 
by experimental volunteers in a magnetic-resonance- imaging tube, or 
the dreaming-up of new moves in surfing, or the copying of a German 
porn doll to market it as Barbie, or the invention of a new kind of mop 
(Poole, 2012). 
It is this tendency to conflate disparate things - attributes, artefacts, 
practices - which is characteristic not just of Lehrer’s book, but of research 
into creativity more generally; the things which are drawn into the frame 
are so diverse and contradictory, so produced by assumptions and 
prejudices about art, craft, problem solving, agency, and thinking itself, 
that it is often difficult to identify what is not ‘creative’. My argument, 
then, is not that Lehrer does science a disservice by (as Poole puts it in a 
later article) ‘cherry picking results and distorting their implications’ and 
by telling ‘simple stories sprinkled with cutting-edge science’ (Poole, 2016) 
but that the field of creativity research is already nothing more than a set 
of more or less nonsensical stories about the origins of the human capacity 
for invention. We can explore this by following Foucault’s example when 
he suggests that: 
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The problem does not consist in drawing the line between that 
in a discourse which falls under that category of scientificity or 
truth, and that which comes under some other category, but in 
seeing historically how effects of truth are produced within 
discourses which in themselves are neither true nor false 
(Foucault, 1984: 60).  
It is important, then, to recognise that science does not take place in a 
hygienic realm, free from the contaminants of language and culture (see, 
for example, Popper, 2002; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Doyle, 2017). In the 
field of creativity research there are some distinctive discursive traits 
which produce and reproduce particular notions of creativity, by which I 
mean not just ways of speaking and writing about creativity, but ways of 
constructing it through particular procedures and conditions. A focus on 
language, discourse and rhetoric enables us to describe ‘creativity’ as a 
construction rather than a ‘thing’ with ontic stability anchored in the real 
world; just as Richard Rorty suggests that philosophy is a kind of writing 
(Rorty, 1978: 143) creativity, too, is built upon metaphorical 
representations of the relationship between mind and body, and signs and 
referents. Creativity, in this light, becomes a mythical construction like 
‘love’, ‘violence’ or ‘national identity’. And like love, national identity, and 
maybe even violence, it offers some reassuring ideas about who we are 
and our place in the world; like all fairy tales, there is no reality here, but 
there are potential pleasures, nonetheless. Lehrer’s book, then, is a 
conveniently paradoxical place from which to launch a critique of the 
science of creativity; Lehrer may have included actual falsehoods but these 
tend to mask the more widespread misconceptions in the field of creativity 
research which it faithfully (if excitedly) reports. 
In what follows I argue for an approach to creativity which focuses on 
language and discourse; then for the need to interrogate the assumptions 
underlying the procedures of creativity research, using some of Lehrer’s 
examples; next, the ways in which research correlates art and creativity; 
and finally the ways in which a ‘science of the creative city’ lends itself to 
myth-making in policy. I conclude by suggesting that Lehrer’s work is 
entirely consistent with the myth-making of creativity research – none of 
it is ‘true’, but by suspending our disbelief it enables us to indulge in 
comforting fantasies about human exceptionalism. 
An Anti-ontology of Creativity 
A focus on the discourse and rhetoric of creativity is a modest, but radical 
strategy – radical because it destabilises the notion that creativity is a thing 
with independent existence. Banaji et al. (2006), for example, recognise 
the discursive dimension of creativity and, with great economy, they 
identify a range of different, often contradictory, versions of the concept. 
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The choice of the word rhetoric, with its connotations of philosophy and 
literary analysis is telling, as is their use of the plural – a simple, but 
profound indicator that creativity is not a unitary entity or concept. They 
elaborate: 
By rhetorics we mean in this context a subset of discourse, characterised 
by specific properties: 
• They are highly elaborated structures, drawing on distinctive 
traditions of philosophical, educational, political and psychological 
thought 
• They are organised to persuade as a form of ‘communicative 
action’…seeking to bring about consensus, leading in some cases to 
intervention in specific contexts of practice 
• They produce discursive frameworks such as key terms and 
taxonomies which can be learnt by practitioners who either need 
them or are obliged to use them. In this way they feed back into more 
general ‘popular’ discourses of creativity (Banaji et al., 2006: 5) 
The groundwork is created here for an ‘anti-ontology’ of creativity, and an 
invitation to engage with a ‘poetics’ of creativity. The authors, however, 
hold back on the anti-ontology, often asking ‘is…?’ questions about 
creativity which, I have argued before, reveals a dependence upon an 
essential premise – that ‘it’ exists and that there is a real phenomenon, 
quality or attribute which is called ‘creativity’ (Readman, 2010: 18).  
We might consider, instead, that creativity is not an object which 
researchers have ‘discovered’, but that it is an arbitrary labelling of a range 
of different behaviours and processes. By refusing to accept the existence 
of creativity as a starting point, and by analysing the language used to 
describe and account for it, we can, I think, reveal the nature of the poetics 
and argue that there is little with tangible status there at all. This more 
radical stance mobilises a Foucaultian approach to discourse which, 
according to Kendall and Wickham, begins by ‘the recognition of a 
discourse as a corpus of ‘statements’ whose organisation is regular and 
systematic’ (Kendall & Wickham, 1999: 42) and entails the recognition 
that ‘statements involve ‘things’ as well as ‘words’. They counsel that ‘The 
crucial thing here is to avoid the idea that [discourse] is a purely linguistic 
term (as in most incarnations of ‘discourse analysis’)’ (Kendall & Wickham, 
1999: 35). To illustrate how this strategy might be useful we could look, 
for example, at the way in which experimental science produces creativity 
discursively, not only through its language and arguments expressed in 
academic papers, but through the tools which it has devised in order to 
identify the object of study, such as Functional Magnetic Resonance 
Imaging (fMRI), the electroencephalogram (EEG), and the administration 
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of these tests in laboratory conditions. These processes are implicated in 
the language and arguments, and they also inform the language and 
arguments. Showing how creativity becomes discursively active as a 
concept entails locating it within particular contexts and identifying how 
these contexts create the conditions for creativity to be manifested in a 
particular way. And discourse, as a concept, enables us to see the 
relationships between rhetorical enunciation and power; power, that is, as 
a force by which meaning is asserted – through language, institutions and 
operations. 
Scientism and Creativity 
An examination of some of the experiments that Jonah Lehrer discusses 
certainly reveals a degree of ‘cherry picking’, but also shows how the 
experiments themselves reify creativity as something tangible. The 
rationale for experimental approaches to creativity proposed by Mark 
Runco and Shawn Sakamoto illuminates how this process of reification 
works:  
Creativity is among the most complex of human behaviours. It seems to 
be influenced by a wide array of developmental, social, and educational 
experiences, and it manifests itself in different ways in a variety of 
domains. The highest achievements in the arts are characterized by 
their creativity, as are those in the sciences. Creativity is also quite 
common in a wide range of everyday activities. 
They infer, therefore, that: 
The complex nature of creativity suggests that meaningful research 
must take multiple influences and diverse forms of expression into 
account. Experimental research on creativity is useful precisely for this 
reason. Experimental methods utilize various controls to reduce 
complexity to a manageable level (Runco & Sakamoto, 1999: 62) 
The experimental method works on the basis that a complex phenomenon 
can be broken down into its component parts, each part understood, then 
reassembled and thereby, the whole understood. This method legitimises 
the kinds of laboratory experiments described by Lehrer, such as Mark 
Jung-Beeman’s work on insight (Lehrer, 2012: 8-19). Jung-Beeman et al., 
actually mention the noun ‘creativity’ just once – in the introduction when 
they say that insight occurs in ‘various forms of practical, artistic, and 
scientific creativity’ and the adjective once when they say that 
‘Performance on insight problems is associated with creative thinking…’ 
(Jung-Beeman et al., 2004: 0500).  
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This ‘argument by association’ is typical in the creativity literature and is a 
very common feature in Lehrer’s book, in which he cuts back and forth 
between the experimental work on insight and his narrative about Bob 
Dylan rediscovering his mojo, arguing that Dylan’s ‘uncontrollable rush of 
a creative insight’ (Lehrer, 2012: 19) exemplifies the ‘Aha!’ moments 
sought in Jung-Beeman et al.’s study. It is not just the association implied 
through contiguity in the book which creates this sense of unity, but also 
the adjective ‘creative’ which is used to modify or augment ‘insight’ in the 
quote above. In addition, we learn from Jung-Beeman et al. that the 
anterior superior temporal gyrus in the right hemisphere of the brain is 
‘the most likely area to contribute to this component of insight problem 
solving’ (2004: 0501) and, consequently, Lehrer reports confidently that 
‘During those first frantic minutes of writing, [Dylan’s] right hemisphere 
found a way to make something new out of this incongruous list of 
influences’ (Lehrer, 2012: 21). But this is not to say that Lehrer is alone in 
creating myths; Jung-Beeman et al. use the story of Archimedes to provide 
a model for the kind of insight that is sought in their experimental work 
and, although it is referred to as a ‘legend’ (0500) it is the notion of the 
‘Eureka!’ moment which underpins the work and the article. As the article 
progresses, the legendary status of the Archimedes story recedes until by 
the end it is discussed as if it were historical fact:  
In the two millennia since Archimedes shouted “Eureka!”, it has seemed 
common knowledge that people sometimes solve problems – whether 
great scientific questions or trivial puzzles – by a seemingly distinct 
mechanism called insight (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004: 0507). 
Curiously no other specific examples of the ‘Eureka!’ moment are adduced 
(despite the ‘two millennia’ of opportunity), so Archimedes is offered as 
the ideal subject to represent the subjective experience of insight, just as 
for Jonah Lehrer Bob Dylan is the ideal subject to exemplify his 
breakthrough when writing ‘Like a Rolling Stone’ (Lehrer, 2012: 19-24). 
This work on insight, which is connected tangentially to creativity, reveals 
some of the associative rhetoric at work. We can also see a process of 
reification at work, that is, an attempt to make the invisible and intangible 
into something concrete. The experiment is an attempt to identify, in the 
brain, particular ‘events’ and to see if they ‘are as sudden as the subjective 
experience (Jung-Beeman et al., 2004: 0506) and, because the subjective 
experience of ‘sudden insight’ has been rhetorically linked with creativity, 
it is possible for Lehrer to argue that ‘a flicker of electricity inside the head’ 
(2012: 19) can be precisely located.  
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The Seductions of Correlation, or: How science makes sense 
of art 
Scientific experiments into creativity tend to be characterised in following 
way: a ‘phenomenon’ (say, musical improvisation) is identified and its 
essential (‘creative’) nature is assumed to be evident, which then justifies 
an investigation into its cause. What often follows is a rhetorical shift from 
identifying correlation to generating aetiological theory – in other words, 
an activity which is categorised as ‘creative’ is correlated with neurological, 
psychological, sociological events, and causes are inferred.  
But the ‘creative’ activity observed is the result of an act of interpretation 
- its nature is inferred because there is already a culturally acquired 
investment in what creativity is supposed to be. In the well-known case of 
Tommy McHugh, for example, a builder who suffered a subarachnoid 
haemorrhage and subsequently became obsessed with producing 
sculptures and paintings the researchers infer that this kind of production 
represents ‘artistic creativity’: 
He drew hundreds of sketches, mainly of faces, all of them asymmetric. 
This was followed by large-scale drawings on the walls of his house 
sometimes covering whole rooms. He claims the brain injury has left 
him obsessed with making art and he now spends most of his day 
painting and sculpting (Lythgoe et al., 2005: 397)  
When these researchers looked at Tommy McHugh, they saw a man 
making up poems, crafting clay sculptures and painting, all of which were 
assumed to be markers of creativity. But they could equally have been 
markers of compulsive behaviour. Here, then, the products of the 
compulsive production have been judged as more significant than the 
compulsion itself. And, perhaps unsurprisingly for neuroscientists, the 
perceived breakthrough here is believed to be the insight into a specific 
brain mechanism of creativity: 
The emergence of artistic skills following subarachnoid haemorrhage 
may represent another platform into the mechanisms of artistic 
creativity and an unrecognized attribute of this type of brain injury 
(Lythgoe et al., 2005: 398) 
Discursively, this work contributes to a pathological model of creativity 
which is persuasive because it opens up the possibility of ‘prescription’ as 
a result of ‘diagnosis’, in other words, if the causes can be diagnosed then 
it might be possible to create the conditions for the non-pathological to 
‘be creative’ (a kind of ‘reverse cure’). But there is a tension here, and at 
its heart is the question of agency; if one is compelled to ‘be creative’ then 
what is the status of that process? When Noël Carroll (1999), for example, 
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employs a philosophical approach to defining the work of art, the intention 
of the artist to create an aesthetic experience is always present in some 
form. Similarly, Anthony Storr’s psychoanalytically grounded exploration 
of creative drive and motive resists the idea that ‘…the artist is a man who 
can only achieve satisfaction for his instinctual drives in phantasy…’ (Storr, 
1972: 17). This seems to be at the root of Lehrer’s fetishisation of ‘science’ 
as opposed to any particular model of brain, body or context; he flirts with 
pathology, only to reveal possible ways of ‘hacking’ oneself in order to be 
creative. There are obvious, similar attractions to computational 
paradigms for the brain (see, for example, Boden, 2014). 
Lehrer discusses a range of cases of frontotemporal dementia – a disease 
of the prefrontal cortex (and, incidentally, the primary point of comparison 
for Mark Lythgoe and his colleagues in the case of Tommy McHugh): 
These patients are suddenly overcome with the desire to paint and draw 
and sculpt. They lose interest in everything else. Then, after they have a 
few precious years of ecstatic productivity, the disease that inspired 
their art destroys their brains (Lehrer, 2012: 106). 
Again, the output here is unproblematically categorised as ‘art’, and by 
implication ‘creative’, because it includes painting, drawing and sculpture. 
And from this pathological context he presents us with a ‘hack’ – a way of 
‘silencing temporarily’ (as opposed to destroying) the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex via repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS). 
This ‘hack’ is presented in the work of Allan Snyder whose paper cited here 
is titled ‘Savant-like skills exposed in normal people by suppressing the left 
fronto-temporal lobe’ (Snyder et al., 2003). The paper uses the word 
‘creativity’ only once, in the keywords, although Lehrer (presumably 
quoting an interview rather than the paper) tells us that Snyder refers to 
TMS (Lehrer omits the ‘r’) as a “creativity amplifying machine”, and refers 
to the “creativity treatment” that he administers to his subjects (Lehrer, 
2012: 109). There is a speculative model of the brain underpinning this 
research – that of the ‘modular brain’, which comprises distinct areas with 
discrete functions. The modular brain is a seductive idea because it 
provides a way of breaking down complex behaviours into more 
manageable ones, and when activity in a particular area of the brain 
correlates with particular human activity it excites scientists with the 
promise of causality.  
Snyder et al. begin with the phenomenon of ‘the astonishing skills of 
savants’ and speculate that they are ‘latent in everyone’. The focus on 
drawing skills is significant in this experiment, as it elides ‘artistic skills’ 
with ‘savant-like skills’, and the tensions between wholly cultural 
assessments of artistic products and the scientific method emerge in this 
statement: 
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In order to ensure objectivity, a committee first inspected all of the 
drawings (arranged in random order) to judge them for the “best” art. 
This did not lead to any consensus…however, a subsequent committee 
was asked to judge whether drawings… within any series showed a 
demonstrable change of scheme or convention. This led unambiguously 
to the sets we present here. Ratings by raters who are blind to the order 
of the drawings is a standard method of psychological evaluation 
(Snyder et al., 2003: 151). 
The rhetoric of assertion is evident here – the need to persuade us of 
objectivity, of standard methods, of the validity of judgements based on 
randomised elements and of the expertise of an anonymous ‘committee’. 
For Lehrer, this scientific method is proof positive that by suppressing the 
left fronto-temporal lobe one can release one’s inner artist: 
Before subjects are treated with TMS, most of their drawings are crude 
stick figures that don’t look very much like anything. However, after 
people receive their “creativity treatment”, their drawings are often 
transformed; the figures are suddenly filled with artistic flourishes. 
(Lehrer, 2012: 109). 
Through a rhetorical sleight of hand in Snyder et al. ‘creativity’ emerges 
from ‘artistry’, which in turn emerges from ‘savantism’. And the ‘modular 
brain’ also comes into focus as a legitimate, uncontested paradigm, 
despite evidence that it is a site of debate; see for example, Patricia 
Churchland who argues that ‘…any neuronal business of any significant 
complexity is underpinned by spatially distributed networks, and not just 
incidentally, but essentially’ (Churchland, 2015: 286), and Matthew Cobb 
who talks about ‘…the mistaken impression that our brains are composed 
of anatomically distinct modules’ (Cobb, 2020). Just as Lehrer fetishises 
science, there are scientists who fetishise the brain, which is not to say 
that the brain is insignificant – as Raymond Tallis says: “Chop my head off 
and my IQ descends” (Parry, 2011) – but that the quest for a specific 
location for ‘creativity’ is always a narrative freighted with particular 
assumptions, tools and desires.  
Stories from the (Creative) City 
The second half of Lehrer’s book is sociological rather than neuroscientific. 
One might assume that the methodological and epistemological 
contradictions between such diverse studies might be problematic, but 
‘creativity’ is an amorphous concept and incredibly absorbent. Lehrer’s 
strategy is consistent – to assert that he is adducing scientific evidence of 
‘how creativity works’. When describing research into urban innovation he 
focuses on the character of Geoffrey West who ‘likes to compare himself 
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to Kepler, Galileo, and Newton, since he’s also a theoretical physicist in 
search of fundamental laws’ and ‘…he wanted his advice to be wholly 
empirical, rooted in the strictness of facts. West was tired of urban theory 
– he wanted to invent urban science’ (Lehrer, 2012: 184-185). It is ironic 
that West dismisses modern urban theory as ‘storytelling’ without ‘rigour’ 
given the ways in which Lehrer constructs him as the hero of this particular 
story (West’s co-authors don’t get a mention, apart from the first author 
of the cited paper, Luis Bettencourt – ‘another physicist who had given up 
on physics’) and the ways in which the scientific process is described. 
Interestingly, as with some of the other papers discussed here, 
Bettencourt et al. only mention ‘creativity’ once:  
We believe that the further extension and quantification of urban 
scaling relations will provide a unique window into the spontaneous 
social organization and dynamics that underlie much of human 
creativity, prosperity, and resource demands on the environment 
(Bettencourt et al., 2007: 7306). 
Perhaps realising that ‘creativity’, the noun, is a potential hostage to 
fortune, the emphasis is on the factors underlying creativity; rhetorically 
this adjectival hedging is not an uncommon strategy. Another feature is 
the use of the proxy ‘innovation’, a word which is less problematic, and 
often allied with creativity. For Lehrer, the implied revelations are 
sufficient for him to use the research to provide insights into ‘the most 
creative cities’. The obvious seduction of this work for Lehrer is the 
scientific method – cities are rendered as data, patterns are discerned and 
represented graphically, and outputs such as ‘wealth and knowledge 
creation’ are measured statistically (knowledge creation in the form of 
new patents, that is). He is particularly enthusiastic about a physics 
metaphor, which somehow becomes a literal explanation for how cities 
generate new ideas: 
They compare urban residents to particles with velocity bouncing off 
one another and careening in unexpected directions. The most creative 
cities are simply the ones with the most collisions (Lehrer, 2012: 190). 
It is this evocation of the scientific discourse which creates the illusion of 
unity between work on urban growth and the earlier chapters on 
‘creativity centres’ in the brain. In addition, the poetry of cities creating 
‘sparks’ and ‘collisions’ suggests that the brain and the city might be more 
than metaphorically related, and that in some respects they operate in the 
same way.  
And what this masks, of course, is the accommodation of a neoliberal 
mobilisation of the idea of ‘creativity’ – something popularised by Richard 
Florida (not mentioned by Lehrer, perhaps because the work lacks the 
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necessary ‘scientific heft’) along with his concept of a ‘creative class’. This 
is built upon (perhaps paradoxically) a notion of romantic individualism 
and ‘people’s intrinsic motivations’ (Florida, 2002: 101), despite his 
entreaty in the final chapter for the creative class to: 
Evolve from an amorphous group of self-directed, albeit high-achieving, 
individuals into a more cohesive, more responsible group (Florida, 
2002: 316). 
The promise of wealth and knowledge creation, along with urban 
regeneration has led to an uncritical embrace of the ‘creative class’ and 
Florida’s book, as Oli Mould points out ‘…is used to justify continued 
inward investment and gentrification, as long as it looks creative’ (Mould, 
2018: 24).  
What creativity looks like, in this context, probably conforms to something 
like the UK Department of Culture Media and Sport’s mapping document 
for the creative industries, which includes: advertising; architecture; art 
and antiques markets; crafts; design; designer fashion; film and video; 
interactive leisure software; music; performing arts; publishing; software 
and computer services; and television and radio (DCMS, 2001). As an 
arbitrary category – a container for a range of economic activities more or 
less engaged in the production of cultural artefacts – this might work, but 
as the foreword, written by then Culture Secretary, Chris Smith, makes 
clear, there is a morality, perhaps even a spirit being mobilised here: 
Our creative industries […] are a real success story, and a key element 
in today’s knowledge economy. All of this is, of course, founded on 
original creativity – the lifeblood of these industries… I want all young 
people to have the opportunity to express and channel their creativity 
through a wide range of activities, including for some a career in the 
creative industries… I want all businesses to think creatively, to realise 
creativity is not an add-on but an essential ingredient for success. 
(DCMS, 2001). 
Creativity, here then, is more than an expedient means of categorising a 
range of industries – these industries, supposedly, capture some kind of 
essence of this quality (a pro-social quality which provides opportunity, 
enrichment and profit). This is why a later report by the British Council 
revealed how some workers in these industries cavilled at the inclusion of 
others – they believed that some industries were genuinely creative, 
whereas others were merely present by association with something more 
noble: 
  
Exchanges: The Interdisciplinary Research Journal 
 
51 Readman. Exchanges 2020 8(1), pp. 40-56 
 
The presence of the antiques trade on the DCMS list has also been 
challenged, on the grounds that there is no fresh act of creation 
involved, merely the retail of pre-existing ones (British Council, 2010: 
18). 
What Jonah Lehrer does in Imagine is not very different from what 
creativity research, science and policy like this inevitably does: it elides 
differences between a range of internal and external activities; it seeks an 
essence; it uses assertion; it creates felicitous associations upon which are 
built more robust assertions; it attempts to reify the intangible and make 
visible the invisible; it infers the existence of creativity from associated 
phenomena; it produces ‘creativity’ through rhetorical and discursive 
means, which include the poetic invocations of spirit and self-
determination as well as the moves of power constituted by authoritative 
citation and the construction of subjects.  
Let’s consider, finally, how all this nonsense might be comforting. 
The Consolations of Creativity: Suspending one’s disbelief 
The creativity literature is a vast sprawling field which encompasses many 
disciplines and, as in Lehrer’s book, the epistemological and 
methodological contradictions are somehow subordinated to the promise 
of insight, self-actualisation and economic growth.  
Some recent work, however, offers a necessary critical intervention. 
Angela McRobbie, for example, adopts a Foucaultian stance and argues 
that creativity has become something ‘…which has the potential to be 
turned into a set of capacities. The resulting assemblage of ‘talent’ can 
subsequently be unrolled in the labour market or ‘talent-led economy’’. 
She develops the notion of the ‘creativity dispositif’ which ‘comprises 
various instrument, guides, manuals, devices, toolkits, mentoring 
schemes, reports, TV programmes and other forms of entertainment’ and 
which constitute a form of ‘governmentality (McRobbie, 2016: 22). 
McRobbie uses this notion of governmentality to explain how young 
people might embrace precarity and construct themselves as neoliberal 
subjects – to become active agents in their own exploitation.  
Similarly, Oli Mould argues that ‘creativity has become a straitjacket, a 
character trait that fuels the further imposition of that very same 
[individualistic] narrative. Sure, everyone is creative, but only those who 
have ‘made it’ (those with the privilege) have the luxury of profiting from 
that creativity’ (Mould, 2018: 159). 
Andreas Reckwitz, like McRobbie, in Foulcaultian mode, carries out 
detailed genealogical work in order to present the historical cultural 
‘invention’ of creativity. He suggests, though, that ‘we should not make a 
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blanket declaration of war on the aesthetic and the regimes of novelty and 
audience, because we would then run the risk of moral fundamentalism, 
anti-modern conservatism, or the idyll of the private self’, and advocates, 
instead, ‘strategies for the self-containment of the aesthetic and of the 
regimes of novelty and the audience’ (Reckwitz, 2017: 235). 
Whereas Mould ends with a battle cry, to reclaim ‘creativity’ as a radical, 
revolutionary act, Reckwitz’s response is more modest – a withdrawal 
rather than a charge – but both ask us to reject the cant.  
Perhaps a third way is detached indulgence – a suspension of disbelief. In 
Gareth Tunley’s film The Ghoul (2016) the psychotherapist Morland played 
by Geoff McGivern encourages his troubled patient to make his depression 
tangible: 
A lot of what I do is trying to distract you, rather like a stage magician. 
Only the rabbit I’m trying to pull from the hat is the solution to your 
depression…when a magician raises a demon or an angel it may only be 
real in his head, but if it’s real to him it may as well be real, full stop. If 
he makes it into something tangible then he can deal with what it 
represents. It’s the process that matters (The Ghoul, 2016). 
This is not so much a leap of faith as a willingness to be duped – an 
awareness that there will be some benefits from allowing the fantasy to 
exist. And creativity is a pleasurable fantasy, as Mould points out, 
parodying Richard Florida’s thesis: “we are all creative; we just need to 
‘unleash’ that creativity on the world (Mould, 2018: 25).  
In a recent episode of BBC Radio 4’s arts programme Front Row, the 
presenter John Wilson asks his guest, George the Poet: 
We’re hearing a lot at the moment about this lockdown stimulating 
creativity and people tapping into skills that possibly they’d forgotten 
about, or never even tried before. How has it affected you? Have you 
found yourself writing more at home? What effect has it had on your 
own personal creativity? 
George the poet replies: 
A message to anyone out there that feels pressure to be suddenly 
amazing: a lot of what you are going to deliver is already within you, 
and sometimes it’s the case of you just being still, being in the moment, 
just accepting the situation and then allowing the creativity to flow 
(Front Row, 2020). 
There is a hydraulic metaphor at work here – the figure of creativity as a 
liquid force within the body, which needs to be ‘tapped’ or released in 
order to flow. It is the metaphor favoured by creativity theorist Mihaly 
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Csikszentmihalyi (1996) which conjures up a semi-conscious state of losing 
oneself in an activity. It recalls the ‘lifeblood’ metaphor which, incidentally, 
is one of the BBC’s stated values: “Creativity is the lifeblood of our 
organisation” (BBC 2020). And it is a particularly seductive metaphor at a 
time when people’s freedoms are restricted, and the notion of human 
exceptionalism is undermined. To believe that self-expression is an index 
of something which makes us more than merely potential hosts for a virus 
is appealing, even if we have few illusions about the quality of that self-
expression.  
This link between human exceptionalism and creativity is made explicit in 
Kazuo Ishiguro’s novel Never Let Me Go (2005) in which we meet a group 
of friends at boarding school. We learn that creativity is valued highly and 
that the students are urged to paint, draw and sculpt, but we aren’t sure 
what’s at stake in this. We hear that ‘There’d been no real change in 
Tommy’s work – his reputation for ‘creativity’ was as low as ever’ (22) but 
that one of the teachers had ‘known a lot of students…who’d for a long 
time found it very difficult to be creative: painting, drawing, poetry, none 
of it going right for years. Then one day they’d turned a corner and 
blossomed’ (27). It’s not until later that we learn that the students are 
clones, reared for organ donation, and that their creativity is nurtured by 
the benevolent school as proof of their humanity; as one of the teachers 
says: ‘We took away your art because we thought it would reveal your 
souls. Or to put it more finely, we did it to prove you had souls at all (255). 
There is a germ of something recognisable in this grotesque dystopian 
fantasy; sensitivity, soulfulness, spirituality, authenticity, humanity, are all 
terms which circulate around notions of creativity. As George the Poet 
implies, one’s essential, inner self is revealed through the ‘flow’ of 
creativity. 
Jonah Lehrer’s Imagine: How Creativity Works may be tainted by the 
inclusion of some made-up Bob Dylan quotes, but even if they were 
genuine the book would be no more or less authoritative; it tells us stories 
about research which is already founded on and which perpetuates myths 
about ‘creativity’, so seeking a distinction between that which is ‘true’ and 
that which is ‘false’ seems like a rather quaint and artificial binary. One 
reviewer, perhaps with a sense of this, argued for the book’s 
rehabilitation, regardless of the author’s sins, because, he said, ‘it worked 
for me’ (Clark, 2012). 
The book does not do a disservice to the ‘science of creativity’, because 
the bulk of the creativity literature is already smoke and mirrors. The 
concept of creativity is constituted through the activation of particular 
tropes which make sense of, and mobilise, a whole range of disparate, real 
activities and processes. Some of these activities and processes are 
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internal and cognitive, some are external and practical, but in a range of 
very different contexts - scientific, pedagogic, spiritual and artistic for 
example – they are all nominated as ‘creative’, and as a result of this 
nominalisation these processes and activities become meaningful, 
valuable, connected and useful or applicable.  
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